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The Battle of Carrhae was fought in 53 BC between the Roman Republic and the Parthian Empire near the town of Carrhae. The Parthian Spahbod ("General") Surena the Iranian decisively defeated a numerically superior Roman invasion force under the command of Marcus Licinius Crassus. It is commonly seen as one of the earliest and most important battles between the Roman and Parthian empires and one of the most crushing defeats in Roman history. Crassus, a member of the First Triumvirate and the wealthiest man in Rome, had been enticed by the prospect of military glory and riches and decided to invade Parthia without the official consent of the Senate. Rejecting an offer from the Armenian King Artavasdes II to allow Crassus to invade Parthia via Armenia, Crassus marched his army directly through the deserts of Mesopotamia. His army clashed with Surena's force near Carrhae, a small town in modern-day Turkey. Despite being heavily outnumbered, Surena's cavalry completely outmaneuvered the Roman heavy infantry, killing or capturing most of the Roman soldiers. Crassus himself was killed when truce negotiations turned violent. His death is sometimes associated with the end of the First Triumvirate, however Roman historians state that friction between Crassus and Pompey had always been a greater cause of tension than friction between Julius Caesar and Pompey. The four-year period after Carrhae, to the outbreak of the civil war between Julius and Pompey, argues against Crassus as a peace-keeper. ==Prelude== The war in Parthia resulted from political arrangements intended to be mutually beneficial for Crassus, Pompeius Magnus, and Julius Caesar — the so-called First Triumvirate. In March and April 56 BC, meetings were held at Ravenna and Luca, in Caesar's province of Cisalpine Gaul, to reaffirm the weakening alliance formed four years earlier. It was agreed that the triumvirate would marshal their supporters and resources to secure legislation for prolonging Caesar's Gallic command and to influence the upcoming elections for 55 BC, with the objective of a second joint consulship for Crassus and Pompeius.〔Both Pompeius and Crassus held their first consulship in 70 BC, fifteen years earlier.〕 The leaders of the triumvirate aimed to expand their faction's power through traditional means: military commands, placing political allies in office, and advancing legislation to promote their interests. Pressure in various forms was brought to bear on the elections: money, influence through patronage and friendship, and the force of a thousand troopers brought from Gaul by Crassus's son Publius. The faction secured the consulship and most, though not all, of the other offices sought. Legislation passed by the tribune Trebonius (the ''lex Trebonia'') granted extended proconsulships of five years, matching that of Caesar in Gaul, to the two outgoing consuls. The Spanish provinces would go to Pompeius; Crassus arranged to have Syria, with the transparent intention of going to war with Parthia.〔This political overview primarily derives from Erich S. Gruen, "Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy, and the Conference of Luca," ''Historia'' 18 (1969) 71–108, especially 107–108. The literature on the triumvirate's political deal-making in 56 BC is vast. Other works consulted include Ronald Syme, ''The Roman Revolution'' (Oxford University Press, 1939, reissued 2002), limited preview ( online ), particularly Chapter 3, "The Domination of Pompeius"; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "Consular Provinces under the Late Republic, II," ''Journal of Roman Studies'' 29 (1939) 167–183; G.R. Elton, "The Terminal Date of Caesar's Gallic Proconsulate," ''Journal of Roman Studies'' 36 (1946) 18–42; Thomas N. Mitchell, "Cicero before Luca (September 57–April 56 BC)," ''Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association'' 100 (1969) 295–320; Colm Luibheid, "The Luca Conference," ''Classical Philology'' 65 (1970) 88–94; Anthony J. Marshall, review of ''Crassus: A Political Biography'' by B.A. Marshall (Amsterdam 1976) and ''Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic'' by A.M. Ward (University of Missouri Press, 1977), ''Phoenix'' 32 (1978) 261–266; Christian Meier, ''Caesar'', translated by David McLintock (BasicBooks, 1982), pp. 270–273. To balance an historical tradition generally hostile toward Crassus, see T.J. Cadoux, "Marcus Crassus: A Revaluation," ''Greece & Rome'' 3 (1956) 153–161.〕 The notoriously wealthy Marcus Crassus was around sixty and hearing-impaired〔Cicero, ''Tusculan Disputations'' 5.40.116, says that Crassus had poor hearing ''(male audiebat)'', as cited by Elizabeth Rawson, “''Crassorum funera'',” ''Latomus'' 41 (1982), p. 541.〕 when he embarked on the Parthian invasion. Greed is often regarded by the ancient sources, particularly his biographer Plutarch, as his major character fault and also his motive for going to war.〔Plutarch, ''Crassus'' 2 on greed, 14.4 on greed and envy, 16 on Crassus's eagerness for the Parthian campaign; see Bill Thayer's edition of the Loeb Classical Library translation at LacusCurtius (online. )〕 Historian of Rome Erich Gruen believed that Crassus's purpose was to enrich the public treasury, since personal wealth was not what Crassus himself most lacked.〔Erich S. Gruen, "M. Licinius Crassus: A Review Article," ''American Journal of Ancient History'' 2 (1977), p. 125.〕 Most modern historians tend to view insatiable greed, envy of Pompey's military exploits, and rivalry as his motivation, since Crassus’s long-faded military reputation had always been inferior to that of Pompeius - and after five years of war in Gaul, to that of Caesar. His major military achievements had been the defeat of Spartacus in 71 and his victory at Battle of the Colline Gate for Sulla a decade earlier.〔(RedRampant - The Battle of Carrhae ), Retrieved 10 May 2007〕 Plutarch notes that Caesar wrote to Crassus from Gaul, endorsing the plan to invade Parthia — an indication that he regarded Crassus's military campaign as complementary and not merely rivalrous to his own.〔Plutarch, ''Crassus'' 16.3.〕 Another factor in Crassus's decision to invade Parthia was the expected ease of the campaign. The Roman legions had easily crushed the numerically superior armies of other eastern powers such as Pontus and Armenia, and Crassus expected Parthia to be an easy target.〔Plutarch, ''Crassus'' 18.4.〕 Cicero, however, suggests an additional factor: the ambitions of the talented Publius Crassus, who had commanded successful campaigns in Gaul under Caesar. Upon his return to Rome as a highly decorated officer, Publius took steps to establish his own political career. Roman sources view the Battle of Carrhae not only as a calamity for Rome and a disgrace for Marcus Crassus, but also as a tragedy for cutting short Publius Crassus's promising career.〔Rawson, “''Crassorum funera'',” pp. 540–549. See also Ronald Syme, "The Sons of Crassus," ''Latomus'' 39 (1980) 403–408, and article on Publius Licinius Crassus (son of triumvir).〕 Some Romans objected to the war against Parthia. Cicero calls it a war ''nulla causa'' (“with no justification”), on the grounds that Parthia had a treaty with Rome.〔Cicero, ''De finibus'' 3.75.〕 The tribune Ateius Capito put up strenuous opposition, and infamously conducted a public ritual of execration as Crassus prepared to depart.〔F.E. Adcock, "The Legal Term of Caesar's Governorship in Gaul," ''Classical Quarterly'' 26 (1932), pp. 23–24; on omens and curses, see article Gaius Ateius Capito (tribune).〕 Despite protests and dire omens, Marcus Crassus left Rome on November 14, 55 BC.〔Date based on Cicero, ''Ad Atticum'' 4.13.2.〕 Publius Crassus joined him in Syria during the winter of 54–53 BC, bringing with him the thousand Celtic cavalry troopers from Gaul who remained loyal to their young leader until death. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Carrhae」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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